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MICHIGAN
LAW REVIEW
VOL. XVIII. NOVEMBER, 1919 No. I
ARE CHARGES AGAINST THE MORAL CHARACTER OF
A CANDIDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE OFFICE
CONDITIONALLY PRIVILEGED?
THE above specific question, upon which there is a conflict of
. authority, cannot be intelligently discussed without first con-
sidering some features of the general law as to conditional
privilege.'
When conditional privilege is set up as an answer to an action
for defamation, the defence proceeds upon the assumption that the
statement complained of would have been actionable if it had been
made upon an ordinary occasion or under ordinary circumstances.
But the defendant contends that the special occasion of publication
was of such an exceptibnal nature that it confers upon the maker a
qualified protection. He, however, admits that the protection is
only prima facie; and that it is subject to be defeated by proof of
certain facts.
Confusion sometimes results from a failure to notice, or fully
comprehend, the concessions involved in setting up the defence of
conditional privilege. We have just said, in general terms, that the
defence assumes that the statement complained of wo6ld have been
actionable if made upon an ordinary occasion. To speak more par-
ticularly, this general concession involves at least three specific ad-
missions: viz.: that the statement is, (I) defamatory in its nature,
(2) damaging, and (3) not true in point of fact.2
IIn deference to custom we use the term "conditional privilege". Bu' the words
,.privirege" and "conditional" are both objectionable. A better phrase would be "de-
feasible immunity". suggested by Mr. Bower. or "prima facie immunity". or-"prims
facie protection". See Bower. Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation. 342-345. 354.
38-361. 426-A27. 4Q0" Paterson. Liberty of the Presq. 184-186: alqo article by the present
writer, iA Columbia Law Review. x88-Sq.
"if the defendant in in a position to prove the truth of his statement 'he has no
need of privileie: the only use of privilege in in cases where the truth of the statement
cannot be proved'." L.an COLE XICE. C. J. in H-rue v. Joter. i88q. r Timem L. R.
at p. s6z.
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The broad general question raised by the defense of conditional
privilege may be stated thus:
Under what circumstances shall a than be absolved from liability
for uttering a charge which is defamatory, damaging, and not true
in point of fact?
This general question may be subdivided as follows:
I. What special occasions confer prima facie protection (or im-
munity) ?
2. What special facts or circumstances will rebut (defeat or
destroy) the prima facie protection afforded by the special occasion?
As to Question x.:
It has been correctly said that "no definite line can be so drawn
as to mark off with precision those occasions which are privileged,
and separate them from those which are not." [LINDLEY, L. J. in
StUart v. Bell, L. R. (i89i) 2 Qu. B. 341, 346.] Indeed the reasons
for holding occasions specially privileged are often given in such
general terms as to afford little assistance in the solution of particu-
lar problems.3
"One assumes that the statement is false before one begins to consider whether the
occasion was privileged. If it" (the statement) "is true, there is no need for privilege."
SCaUrTox, L. J., in Roff v. British &c. Co., L. R. (ixg8), A K. B. Div. 677, p. 684.
"All vfivilege implies necessarily that there has been faMehood" (incorrect, unfounded
statement) "and private injury. If the imputation were not injurious there would Ere no
right of action; and if it were true it could be justified. Therefore there is no neces-
sity for privilege unless there be a" (pima facie) "libel, and a libel not legally justifi-
able on the ground of truth." Argument of counsel in Wason v. Walter, r868, L. R.
4, Qu. B. 73, P. 76.
"Furthermore, the trial court charged" (in substance) 'that even if the matter was
privileged it must be true " As the truth of the words is ordinarily a complete
defense, and the doctrine of privilege rests usually, if not always, on the assumption
that the words were untrue but excused by the occasion and the circumstances, the error
of the instruction seems plain." PARKzR, J., in State v. Fish, No. ig, z17, 91 New Jer-
sey Law, 228, 231-232; New Jersey Court of Errors; reversing decision of Supreme Court
in go New Jersey Baw, 17.
"The learned judge in the Court below seems to have held that such a privilege, if
It existed, could. only protect statements that were true in fact. But such a limitation
would render the privilege useless." Howe v. Lees, 191o, zx (Australian) Commonwealth
L. R. 361; O'CoNNoa, J., P'. 378.
Compare OSLa,, J. A., in Todd v. Dun, z888, is Ontario App. 8s, p. 98-99.
An admission that a statement was not true in point of fact does not involve the
further admission that the defendant knew the statement to he untrue when he uttered
it. See Odgers, Libel and Slander, 5th ed. 346. The distinction, in legal effect, between
an honestly mistaken statement and a consciously erroneous statement will be noticed
later.
s "The reason for holding any occasion privileged is common convenience and wel.
fare of society. * * " Lixoc.sv, L. J., in Stuart v. Bell, x89, L. R. a Qu. B. 34t, p. 346.
"The theory upon which the kind of publication under discussion is afforded protection
Is of course that of social expediency or comfort." Bower, Code of Actionable Defama-
tion, 400. "Social convenience and freedom of private intercourse being the ground of
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The reasons may, perhaps, be better understood by considering
some typical cases, which are held to constitute special occasions.
Two very common instances are: (I) application by a would-be
master for information as to the character and qualifications of a
person who desires to become his servant; and (2) application by a
merchant for information as to the character and solvency of a
person desiring to purchase from him on credit. Suppose that the
pj rson applied to for information understands that the law is that
gives information at his peril; and that he will, be liable if he
gives unfavorable information which proves incorrect, even though.
he gave it under an honest and non-negligent mistake. Such an un-
derstanding as to the law might not prevent all persons from giving
information to the would-be master or vendor; but it would prob-
ably prevent many persons from giving' unfavorable information.'
Will the frequently preventing the would-be rmaster from obtain-
ing information (which might often, though not always, be correct)
do harm outweighing the occasional damage to the servant by the
honestly giving of incorrect information which is of a defamatory
nature?
The courts practically answer this question in the affirmative;
and for this reason they establish a general rule that this "occasion"
confers prima facie immunity upon the giver of such information
(i. e. that the giving of the information is conditionally privileged).
Undoubtedly there are occasional instances of unfavorable infor-
mation, founded on mistake and causing damage to the servant
or to the applicant for credit. But the mere fact that such instances
occasionally occur is not per se a sufficient reason for refusing to
allow prima facie protection to the giving of information on this
class of occasion. "To make that the test as to any class of cases
would amount to practically abolishing the doctrine of conditional
privilege. The fact that, upon- certain occasions, mistakes are liable
sometimes to occur, constitutes one of the reasons why the law ex-
tends to such occasions the shield of conditional privilege. The
principle upon which the doctrine of conditional privilege rests is,
that the public interest and advantage of freedom of publication,
in each particular class of cages thus protected, outweigh the occa-
this class of prime facie protection in general * * *" Ibid., 401. - * * without such pro-
tection the affairs of life could not go on" (i. t., could not go on with reasonable
comfort). BLAcxnutx, J., in Davies v. Siead, 1870. L. R. S Qu. B. 6o8, p. 6rt.
'As to protection to a communication in answer to inquiries as to the trade credit
of another: "If such communicationS are not protected by the law from the danger of
vexatious litigation in cases where they turn out to be incorrect in fact, the stability
of men engagtd in trade and commerce would be exposed to the greatest hazard, for no
man would answer an inquiry as. to the solvency of another. " Tio A, C. J., zSis.
Smith v. Tkoown, a inw. N. C. 372, p. 38.
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sional private and personal damage thereby caused. It is deemed
in certain classes of cases, more advantageous for the community
at large that particular individuals should occasionally be damaged
with impunity, than that men under the privileged circumstances
should not be at liberty to speak and publish what they (reasonably)
believe to be true, although it may be defamatory of the character
of individuals." 5
As to Question 2:
Assuming that there is a special occasion which confers prima
facie protection, what facts or circumstances will rebut or defeat
such protection?
Notice, at the outset, that the burden of proving facts which re-
but or defeat the prima facie protection is upon the plaintiff. In the
expression "conditional privilege", the term "conditional" might be
supposed to denote the existence of "conditions precedent". But
in reality the so-called conditions are "conditions subsequent". If
the 'occasion' exists, there is prima facie protection, defeasible on!y
if the plaintiff proves certain facts in the nature of conditions sub-
sequent. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show such
facts.
This view, which is sustained by the great weight of recent au-
thority, did not formerly prevail. Hence pleas, not only alleged the
existence of a special occasion for protection, but also denied the
existence of facts which would have the effect of defeating the pro-
tection. And such unnecessary denial on the defendant's part is
still to be found in some recent pleas. That the burden of proof as
to such facts is upon the plaintiff, and that the old form of pleading
is founded on a misconception of the law, are points clearly brought
out by Mr. Bower.6
There is a sharp conflict of authority upon the question what
facts will rebut or defeat the prima facie protection conferred by a
special occasion.
One view, and the more popular view, is, that the existence of
so-called "actual malice" (otherwise termed "express malice" or
"malice in fact") is the only fact which will defeat the prima facie
protection; and that all other facts or circumstances are important
only so far as they furnish evidence of the existence of actual
malice.
I From article by the present writer as to "Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agen-
cies". 14 Columbia Law Review, p. 207.
' See Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, pp. xSo-xsr, especially notes(j) and (1); also pp. 359-361, and p. 426. See 14. Coltimbit Law Review, i9o, note 9;
I Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 316. Mr. Bower prefers to use the phrase
"defeasible immunity" instead of "conditional privilege."
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On the other hand it is contended that there are several facts or
situations, the existence of any one of which constitutes a sub-
stantive defense to the plea of conditional privilege. Some author-
ities hold that one of these facts is the want of reasonable cause for
belief in the truth of the charge; or, in other words, negligence in
not using reasonable care to ascertain the truth.
The various expressions, "actual malice", "express malice", and
"malice in fact", are used as denoting something different from
"itnplied malice" or "malice in law." The two latter phrases now
represent mere fictions, which should be banished from the modem
law.
It was formerly said: (i) that malice was a requisite to prima
facie liability for defamation; but (2) that the existence of malice
was always presumed and need not be proved. The fallacy of this
use of the term malice has been thoroughly exposed of late years."
Both the above statements are pure fiction. Malice, in any actual
sense, is not requisite. Nor is the existence of actual malice pre-
sumed. The second statement (the one as to presumption) is an-
other fiction invented to get rid of the effect of the first fiction.
The law, stripped of fictions, is this: The publication of defama-
tion without legal excuse is prima facie actionable; entirely irre-
spective of the existence of any wrong motive (alias actual malice).
Proof that the publication was made upon a conditionally privileged
occasion furnishes a prima facie answer to the action, as showing
a prima facie excuse for publication. The special occasion fur-
nishes a defence, unless the plaintiff proves facts which rebut such
defence; and one method of rebuttal (some authorities say it is the
only method) is proof of wrong motive (alias actual malice) on
the part of the defendant. In other words: Wrong motive or mal-
ice is no part of a prima facie case; only an answer to a particular
defence, that of conditional privilege
But the common use of the word malice, as descriptive of a fic-
tion requisite and a fiction presumption, led to an erroneous descrip-
tion of the effect of conditional privilege. Thus it was said, in sub-
stance, that a privileged occasion is one which rebuts the presump-
tion of malice which would otherwise arise from the utterance of
TOdgers, Outline of the Law of Libel, 112-114, xx6; 6 Amer. Law Rev. S97. 6o9-
6zo; x Street, Foundations of Legal Liability. 326-3z8; GAYNOR, J., in Prince v. Brooklyn
Daily Eagle, z6 New York Misc., z86, 188; GAYNoR, J., in Ulrich v. New York Press Co.,
23 New York Misc. z68, 171-17a; Markby, Elements of Law, 3d ed. a. 687.
See also paper read before New York State Bar Association, in x898, by Mr. W. A.
Purrington--"An Examination of the Doctrine of Malice as an Essential Element of Re-
sponsibility for Defamation uttered on a Privileged Occasion." 2x Reports of New Yoric
State Bar Association, 137; also printed in 57 Alb. Law Jour., 134, 148.
$See Odgers, Outline of the Law of Libel, ixa; 4 Columbia Law Review, 37.
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untrue defamatory language; (i. e. language which was not true in
point of fact). This form of statement, although adopted by judges
of the highest reputation," is inaccurate and misleading. There is
no presumption of malice requiring to be rebutted.
A more accurate statement of the legal effect of conditional priv-
ilege is the one we have already suggested; viz. that the occasion
tends to show a prima facie excuse for publication; not that it
tends to rebut a fiction presumption of malice.
What meaning has been attributed to the expressions "actual mal-
ice", "express malice", "malice in fact", when used as tests for de-
feating the prima facie protection conferred by a special occasion ?lo
Various meanings are given in the note below. In some of these
quotations the writer or speaker may have had in mind only the
motiVe of spite and ill will. But in others he evidently has in mind
motives other than spite or ill wifl, i. e., cases falling under Mr. Jus-
tice McCARnix's "second head". It should not be undeistoodithat
.the meanings suggested are, in every instance, deemed correct by
the writer from whom they are quoted."
.Conipare EXLZ, J., 9 Exch. 6x8; PAxxr,.B., a Cr. M. & R. $68; LiNOLSY, L, J.,
a 0u. B. 341. 34S; BG.LOW, J., 6 Gray, 94, 97.
10 In Pratt v. British Medical Associ ion, October IS, 1918, 35 Times Law Reports
14, pp. a and 2a, McCmxtoi, J. said:
"It is a matter of regret that a full explanation of the meaning of the word 'malice'
when employed in other than a formal sense is not to be found. Perhaps the word is
incavable of complete definition. There appear, however, to be at least two distinct heads
of actual malice when that word is used to indicate a state of mind in such actions as
defamation or malicious prosecution. The first head is indicated by the words 'spite or
ill will' , * *"
"But the second head is equally important. 'Malice' in the actual sense may exist
even though there be no spite or desire for vengeance in the ordinary sense. The jurist
has enlarged the layman's notion of malice." Then quoting various judges.
u "actuated by some improper motive!'
3 Times Law Rep., p. $os.
"evil motive."
1 8 Tetas Civ. App., V,. 308.
"positive evil motive."
57 Albany Law Journal. 154; 2x New York State Bar Association, 17s.
"bad motives."
57 Albany Law journal, 149; 21 New York State Bar Association, xS6.
"a malicious or guilty motive."
IS' Wisconsin, 438, p. 4S8.
"a want of good faith."
too Arkansas, p. 483:
!"nothing short of had faith- ,
57 Albany Law Jour., xa; at New York State Bar Assoc. x6s.
"the antithesis of good faith."
- 193 Southwestern Reporter, p. 467.
"a malicious purpose to * * * defanie her character under cover of the privilege."
138 New York, p. 324.
"any improper motive which induces the defendant to defame the plaintiff."
Odgera on Libel and Slander. 5th- ed., 343.
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Of course, a defendant may, at the same time, be actuated by
ill will and also by other objectionable motives. The phrase, "wrong
motive" is broad enough to include both these classes. In cases
where there is no ill will, the meanino of "actual malice", in a con-
densed form, seems best expressed by the phrase "wrong motive",
used in the same sense as that given in the last paragraph in the
note; being substantially the view of BRET, L. J. viz.: A wrong
motive is any motive other than the discharge of the duty or the
protection of the interest which gave rise to the occasion on which
the conditional privilege rests.
It is desirable here to avoid the use of the word "malice", an am-
biguous term employed in different senses.12
But there are not only objections to the word. malice. There are
substantial objections to the idea intended to be here conveyed by
it; viz. wrong motive; when stated as the sole fact which will de-
feat prinm facie protection.
"something more than the absence of reasonable griound of belief in the matter
communicated."
Pollock, Torts, 6th Edition 269.
"a wrong feeling in a man's mind."
BRETT, L. J., in Clark v. Moly",eux, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 237, p. 247.
"Malice in fact is not confined to personal spite and ill will. but includes every
unjustifiable intention to inflict injury on the person defamed "
LINDLY, L. J., in Stuart v. Bell, L. R. (89) 2 Q. B. 341, 351.
"Any indirect motive, other than a sense of duty is what the law calls 'malice'."
LOaD CAMPBELL, C. J., I Fost. and Fin. p. 427.
'malice in law means any corrupt motive, any wrong motive or any departure
from duty."
ERLE, C. J., 2 Fast. and Fin. p. 524.
"acting from some other motive than a sense of duty."
COTTON, L. J., 3 Q. B. Div. p. 25t.
"some motive, actuating the defendant, different from that which prima facie ren-
dered the communication privileged, and being a motive contrary to good
morals."
bixoN, J., 5o N. J. Law, p. 279; See 91 N. J. Law, p. 48.
"that the defamatory words, although spoken on a privileged occasion, were not
spoken pursuant to the right and duty which created the privilege but
that they were spoken from some other motive."
LoRING, 3., 220 Mass., p. 177.
In Clark v. Uolynetex, 1877, L. R. 3 Qu. B. Div. 237, BRETT, L. J., said. p. 246:
"If the occasion is privileged, it.is so for some reason, and the defendant is only
entitled to the protection of the privilege if he uses the occasion for that reason. lIe is
not entitled to the protection if he uses the occasion for some indirect and wrong 1motive.
If he uses the occasion to gratify his anger' or his malice, he uses the occasion no- for
the reason which m-ikes the occasion privileged, but for an indirect and. wrong motive.
In other words, the protection is lo-t. if the defendant is actuated by any iiiofiv
other than the discharge of the duty or the protection of the interest which gave rise to
the occasion on which the conditional privilege rests.
52 See, generally. Sir F. Pollock. 14 Law Quarterly Revs. 132, and Torts, 6th ed. 272;
LonD LINDLEY, in South lWalas Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., L. R. (19o5)
App. Cas.. 239, 255; Prof. Ames, IS Harv. Law' Rev. 422, note I.
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We favor what may be called the minority view; viz. that wrong
motive is not the only fact which will defeat the protection prima
facie conferred by a special occasion. We believe that there are
several facts or situations, any one of which, standing alone, will
constitute a substantive defense to a plea of conditional privilege.
These different facts Are now about to be enumerated; although
it is not proposed here to enter upon an extended discussion as to
most of them.
Different facts proof of any one of wlich by the plaintiff will
destroy the prima facie protection, based on the existence of a con-
ditionally privileged occasion :Us
I. That the defendant's communication, exceeded the reasonable
necessity of the occasion as to the matter (the contents, words) of
the communication.
1 4
2. That the defendant's communication exceeded the reasonable
necessity of the occasion as to the manner of making the communi-
cation; that it was given unreasonable publicity.r0
33 Formerly, some courts have included, among circumstances defeating conditional
privilege, the fact that a communication was volunteered and not made in answer to an
inquiry. But earlier cases "cannot now be regarded as sound, in so far as they decide
that the mere fact of voluntariness negatives all possibility of protection." Bower, 528
note (f). A .'udge should not direct the jury. "that the voluntariness of the communica-
tion ipso facto excludes it from immunity." Bower, 130, note (gg). The fact that the
communication was volunteered "is never alone decisive" against the allowance of con-
ditional privilege. Odgers, Libil and Slander, Sth ed. 257. But when there is other evi-
dence raising the question for the jury whether a defendant acted bona fide from a
sense of duty. the fact that the communication was volunteered may be considered by
the jury, and may often influence their verdict. Practically, weaker evidence may 'suffice
to defeat the prima facie immunity, than when he has given the charactei" upon being
requested to do so." See Bower, 128, note f.
14 In England, and in some American courts; it would be held that substantial excess
in matter does not per se, defeat the privilege; that such excess is important only as
furnishing evidence of actual "malice" (i. e. wrong motive); and that the privilege is
not lost unless the jury definitely find the existence of actual malice. This view is illus-
trated by the decision of the higher court in Nevifl v. Fine Art and General Insurance Co.
L. R. (1895), 2 Q. B. i56; L. R. (1897) App. Cas. 68. The defendant sent out a notice
on a privileged occasion. and"unnecessarily inserted in it words which were alleged to be
defamatory of the plaintiff hut which had reference to the matters which rendered the
occasion privileged. The jury found that these words were not true, and that the de-
fendant by inserting them had exceeded the privileged occasion which entitled him to give
the notice; but the jury could not agree upon any answer to the question whether the
words were inserted maliciously. Pol.Locu, B., upon furthL; consideration, gave judg-
ment for plaintiff; holding his entitled to succeed upon the finding of excess; although'
there was no finding of actual malice. But the Court of Appeal held that the excess was
at most but evidence of malice; and that, as the jury had declined to say that the de-
fendant had acted maliciously, judgment must be entered for the defendants. The House
of Lords sustained the result reached ill ihe Court of Appeals. We prefer BAxox Pox.-
LOCK'S view.
25As to publication in a newspaper of attack upon the character of a candidate, see a
later part of this article.
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3. That the defendants acted from wiong motive. (As to the
meaning of this phrase, see quotations in note ante.)
It is generally admitted that ivrong motive, standing alone, will
be sufficient to defeat prinza facie privilege. But it is frequently
said that wrong motive (alias actual malice) is the only ground of
defeating the privilege; it being contended that all other alleged
tests are material only so far as they furnish evidenze of wrong
motive. This view we do not adopt."6
4. That the defendant did not believe his statement to be true.
Undoubtedly, the defendant who states what he does not believe
will generally be found to have made the statement from a wrong
motive. But, as there may be wrong motive on defendant's part
even where he believes his statement, it seems best to keep distinct
these two groups of rebutting the privilege.
It is quite common to prefix "honestly" or "sincerely" or "bona
fide" before the word "believe". But these prefixes may be rejected
as surplusage. "Belief" implies the idea of sincerity. (Bower,
Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, i66, note b, 424, Sec-
tion 3.) If a defendant makes a statement "recklessly, careless
whether it be true or false," he makes it without honest belief in its
truth; he does not believe it. (See LoRD HERSCHELL, in Derry v.
Peek, 1889, L. R. i4 App. Cas. 337, 374.)
5. That the defendant, though believing his statement to be true,
did not have reasonable ground for such belief.
(Sometimes stated in the following form-That defendant was
negligent in not using reasonable care to ascertain the truth of his
statement.)
This "Proposition 5" is rejected by the English Courts. In the
United States there is a conflict of authority on it. The subject
deserves careful consideration.
If it be true that wrong motive is the only ground of defeating
printa facie privilege, then Proposition 5 must be regarded as un-
tenable. Negligence or carelessness is not equivalent to wrong in-
tent or motive; nor would it' always be evidence tending to prove
wrong intent or motive. Pollock is right in saying (Torts, 6th ed.
m Indictment for publishing libellous charges against a County Superintendent of
Schools, who was a candidate for re-election. Court instructed jury, that, if the publi-
cation was for the "sole purpose" of advising the electors, it was privileged. Defendants
objected to the words "sole purpose". Held, instruction correct. State v. Keenan, goo
ZII Iowa. 286, p. 292.
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269) : "To constitute malice" (alias wrong motive) "there must be
something more than the absence of reasonable ground for belief
in the matter communicated.""
"Mere inadvertence or forgetfulness or careless blundering is no
evidence of malice * * * Nor is negligence or want of sound judg-
ment." (Odgers on Libel and Slander, 5th ed. 345.)18
Mr. Odgers says that the fact that a defendant "relied upon hear-
say evidence without, seeking primary evidence is no evidence of
malice." "But," he adds, (5th ed. 353), "it is otherwise where the
defendant wilfully shuts his eyes to any source of information. If
there be means at hand for ascertaining the truth, of which the de-
fendant purposely neglects to avail himself, and chooses rather to
remain in ignorance when he might have obtained full information,
this will be evidence of such wilful blindness as may amount to
malice."'' 9
The above reasons justify our (already stated) conclusion-that,
if wrong motive is'the only ground of defeating conditional privi-
lege, such privilege is not defeated by the mere'fact that the defend-
ant had not* reasonable cause of belief. (In other words, Proposi-
tion 5 would be untenable.)
But Proposition 5 cannot be dismissed in this summary way by
those who, like the present writer, do not admit that wrong motive
is the only ground for defeating the prinma facie protection afforded
by conditional privilege.
"The English rule substantially is that malice" (in the sense of
actual malice or wrong motive) "and malice alone destroys the legal
privilege-a rule to be commended for its simplicity and certainty
" It is sometimes said that "want of probable cause is evidence of malice; but this
appreciably warps the meaning of malice and tends to confusion, creating a new kind of
malice in law. -In England it is admitted that a statement recklessly made, without caring
whether it be true or false, is not privileged, but want of probable cause does not there
suffice to take the privilege away." x Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 315.
"There are some cases whicfi seem to hold that neglect to ascertain the truth of a
charge (failure to exercise reasonable care to ascertain the truth) is, as matter of law,
equivalent to had faith; and for that reason operates, per se, to defeat a claim of privilege.
See Ross v. Imperial Engine Co., z9o6, rio N. V. App. Div. 437); Holmes v. Clisby, 1904,
121 Georgia, 241, 246. We think this view erroneous. Such negligence may be evidence
for a jury to consider in determining the question of fact whether 'there was bad faith;
but it is not. nas matter of law, equivalent to bad faith; nor does proof of negligence con-
clusively establish, as matter of law, the existence of bad faith.
'1If it were in controversy whether the defendant actually believed his statement,
the fact that such belief would have been unreasonable might be weighed by the jury
in determining whether he did in fact believe. But when it is found or admitted that he
did believe in the truth of his statement, the want of reasonable ground for such belief
does not prove that he was actuated by wrong motive L making the statement.
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rather than for its theoretical soundness. In strict theory any abuse
of the privilege is enough. 2 0
"The question naturally arises whether there are other things be-
sides malice which will take away qualified privilege. It is clear
that malice is held to be destructive of privilege because the exist-
ence of it shows an abuse of the privilege. Accordingly there is no
reason why the same thing should not happen when the abuse takes
other forms."
2
'
The general question, as previously stated, is this:
Under what circumstances shall a man be absolved from liability
for uttering a charge which is defamatory, damaging, and not true
in point of fact?
On special occasions, conferringprima facie protection:
(i) Shall there be exoneration, if defendant acted in good faith,
believing in the truth of his statement, although he did not take.
reasonable care to ascertain that his belief was correct?
Or (2) Shall good faith and belief in truth be insufficient to ex-
onerate, in. case he did not take reasonable care to ascertain the
truth?
As to (2) : On the one hand the requirement of care does no in-
justice to the defendant. And, on the other hand, its requirement
will very much lessen the danger of uncompenisated injustice to the
individual who is the subject of the charge.
True: neither wrong motive nor negligence are requisite to es-
tablish prima facie liability for defamation upon non-privileged oc-
casions; i. e. in the great majority of cases. But it does not follow
that their existence may not have the effect of defeating a claim of
protection alleged to be conferred by a special occasion.
Negligence, while not an essential element to prima facie liability
in defamation cases in general, may, nevertheless, be ground for re-
butting prima facie protection in a special class of cases. Professor
Williston, in 24 Harvard Law Review 436, has said: "The whole
law of defamation is inconsistent with any application of the law-
of negligence to either spoken or written words." But the learned
writer was here speaking of negligence as a requisite to liability in
ordinary cases of defamation, i. e. in the non-privileged class of
communications. He was not considering whether it may not con-
stitute an element in forfeiting a special protection conditionally
allowed in exceptional cases.
1I Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, p.. 315-316.
1 Street. Foundations of Legal Liabiilty, p. 314.
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Certain erroneous theories, which influence some modern courts
in defamation cases, can be traced back to their source.
i. As to the view that wrong intent or wrong motive is requisite
to establish prima facie liability for defamation.
This view originates in the far-distant days when the ecclesias-
tical courts were the most important tribunals in England which
dealt with the subject of defamation. Their jurisdiction was based
on the ground that defamation was a sin; and the word inalitia in
the complaint came to be understood as signifying actual wrong
intent or actual wrong motive.-
The present retention of'the word *'maliciously*' in declarations.
in the common law courts "tends to induce a mistaken belief that
it represents a material requisite of the action. ' ' 23
2. As to the view that negligence can never be material in any
aspect in defamation cases; either as to establishing the prima facie
liability, or as to defeating the prima facie protection allowed on
special occasions:
This rests on the popular idea that there is never liability for neg-
ligent language; or, to go back a step further, that there is never
•ny legal duty to be careful in the use of language; no duty to take
reasonable care to tell the truth. Because it has been held that an
action for deceit, involving fraud, cannot be based upon a merely
negligent misrepresentation, it has been thought to follow that there
can be no action for negligence. In 14 Harvard Law Review 184
et seq. I have given reasons for controverting these views; and have
asserted that liability for negligent misstatement has frequently
been imposed under cover of legal fictions."4 And it should be
noted that estoppel is not unfrequently based upon negligence. See
Stevens v. Dennett, 1872, 51 N. H. 324; Ewart on Estoppel, 98, 121-
122. Compare 24 Harvard Law Review 423, 426.25
As to authority, upon the question whether reasonable ground
for belief is requisite to protection upon a conditionally privileged
occasion.
The English Court of Appeals held that it is not requisite. Clark
v. Molyneux, 1877, L. R. 3 Qu. B. Div. 237. This decision is fol-
" See Judge Veeder, 4 Columbia L. Rev. 35-36; see also 6 Am. Law Rev. 6o2.
u See 6o Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 370-371, 464-465.
"See p. 191.
SAs to the dec;sion of the majority of the court in Hanson v. Colbe Newspaper Co.,
1893, 159 Mass. 293. the short answer is that it is wrong, for reasons stated in the dis-
senting opinion of HOLMFS, J., P. 299-305; and it is opposed to the weight of authority.
Moreover the court, while holding that an action of defamation was not maintainable, did
not decide, whether there could be a liability iounded upon negligence.
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lowed in Robinson v. Dun, 1897, 24 Ontario App. 287; but OSLtR,
J. A. seems to have thought it wrong on principle. See opinion,
p. 295.26
In the United States, the decisions are not unanimous.
In Carpenter v. Bailey, 1873, 53 N. H. 59 o , decided four years
prior to the English case of Clark v. Molyneux, it is held that
prima facie protection upon a conditionally privileged occasion is
defeated if the defendant, although honestly believing his state-
ment, had no reasonable ground for such beliefY.
2
The ground taken in Carpenter v. Bailey is sustained by the con-
clusion of Mr. W. A. Purrington, in his paper read before the New
York State Bar Asosciation, in January, 1898.28 He says, "And
it is contended that the general American rule, unlike the English,
requires belief to be reasonable under the circumstances, as well as
honest, not resting in recklessness * * * To every just mind it is
outrageous that one who carelessly and causelessly ruins the reputa-
tion and credit of another may be exempt from civil responsibility
-" In Blake v. Stevens, a %isi prius case, in x864, 4. Fast. & Fin. 232, p. 239, CocX-
zuste, C. J., speaks of the important question whether, in a publication upon a condition-
ally privileged occasion, "you are not called upon to take care to use reasonable care * * *
and diligence in order to be correct." He says: "That seems to be the common sense
of the matter * * " He assumes that the statement there in question was a "mistake";
and asks: "Was it a mistake which arose from want of reasonable diligence and care?"
Section z of Chap. 40, Act of July 6, x895, Statutes S8 and 59 Vict., makes belief
upon reasonable ground a defense to a prosecution for illegal practice under Section z
of that Act.
"Section x. Any person who before, or during any Parliamentary election, shall,
for the purpose of affecting the return of any candidate at such election, make or publish
any false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of such candi-
date, shall be guilty of an illegal practice * * "; and shall also be liable to be restrained
by an injunction from any repetition of such false statement.
"Section 2. No per.on shall be deemed to be guilty of such illegal practice if he can
show that he had reasonable grounds for believing, and did believe, the statement made
by him to be true. * *"
" Carpenter v. Bailey is sustained by Toothaker v. Conant, x898, 9z Maine 438;
BrigOgs v. Garrett, 1886, txs Pa. 404, 414; Conroy v. Pittsburgh Times, 1891, 239 Pa. 334;
Jackson v. Pittsburgh Times, 1893, X52 Pa. 406; Coates v. Wallace, 1897, 4 Pa. Superior,
2S3; Hebner v. Great Northern R. Co., 1899, 78 Minnesota, 289, p. 292; Todd v. East
Liverpool Pub[. Co., 19o6, 29 Ohio C. C. SS, x64-66; Vol. 19 Ohio Circuit (Decisions)
s55; Cobb v. Garlington, 1917, Texas Civ. App., S. C. 193 South Western Reporter, 463,
467.
See also Douglas v. Daisley, 19o2, 114 Fed. R. 628, 632-637; O'Rouirke v. Lewiston'
&Sc. Co. 1896, 89 Maine, 310, 311; McNally v. Burleigh, 1897, 91 Maine, 2a; Mulderig
v. Wilkes-Barre Times, 19o6, 2x5 Pa. State, 470; Burke v. Mascarich, 1889, 81 Cal. 302;
Ranson v. West, 1907, 12S Ky. 457: Edwards v. San Jose Co., 1893, 99 Cal. 435, 437;
WLmtseS, J., in Post Publishing Co. v. Malony, 1893, 50 Ohio St. 71, 84. See also
Crane v. Waters, 882, so Fed. Rep. 61g, 62o, 621.
3*Vol. 2z Reports of the New York State Bar Association, 1898, 137; also printed
in 57 Alb. L. J. 134, 148.
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merely because he did not act out of positive evil motive." Pages
171, 172. Compare Prof, Chase, 23 Am. L. Rev. 366-7, 369, 37o. 21
The view contrary to Carpenter v..Bailey is supported by Barry
v. McCollon, I9O8, 81 Conn. 293; Bays v. Hunt, i882, 6o Iowa 251,
255; Hemmens v. Nelson, 1893, 138 New York, 517, 524; and Haft
v. First National Bank, 1897, i9 New York App. Div. 423, 425-6.
See also Chambers v. Leiser, 19o6, 43 Wash. 285, Root, J. p. 289.
What constitutes evidence of the existence, on defendant's part,
of reasonable cause to believe in the charge?
It is not necessary to show that defendant had personal knowl-
edge (first-hand knowledge) of facts. His belief may be founded
on information received from others, if, under the circumstances,
it was reasonable for him to rely upon it. This would depend upon
the nature of the information and the character of the party giving
it. It might come from-such a source that no reasonable man would
rely 'upon it. . Or the source might be such that all reasonable per-
sons would place confidence in it. A plea that the defendant "was
informed and. believed" that the plaintiff had done the things
charged was held bad on demurrer. It was not equivalent to an
allegation that he had probable cause to believe.3 1
There are statutory provisions in the Criminal Code of several States:
Penal Code of New York: as to a prima facie libellous publication: "The publication
is excused when it is honestly made, in the belief of its truth and upon reasonable
grounds for this belief, and consists of fair comments of the conduct of a person in
respect of public affairs, or upon a thing which the proprietor thereof offers or explains
to the public."
Vol. IV, Consolidated Laws of New York, Edition z9op, Chap. 4o, Article 126, Sec-
tion 1342.
The Minnesota Criminal Code has a provision substantially similar to the above New
York provision, except that it omits the last fourteen words.
Revised Laws of Minnesota, A. D. x9o5, Part IV, Chap. 97, Section 4917.
The Washington Criminal Code contains the following provision: "It is excused
when honestly made in behalf of its truth and fairness and upon reasonable grounds for
such belief, and consists of fair comments upon the conduct of any person in respect
of public. affairs, made after a fair and impartial investigation."
z Remington and Ballinger's Annotated Codes of Washington, Edition of 595o, Title
XIV, Chap. V, Section 2425.
The Pennsylvania, Constitution of x874, Article z, Sec. 7, declares that no conviction
shall be had in any prosecution for the publication of papers relating to the official con-
duct of officers or men in public capacity, or to any other matter proper for public inves-
tigation or information, where the fact that such publication was not maliciously or neg-
ligently made, shall be established to the satisfaction of the jury.
In Barr v. Moore, 1878, 87 Pa. St. 38f, 392, it was held that this refers only to a
trial on an indictment for libel and does not apply to a civil action to recover damages.
S. P. xI Pa. St. 404, p. 411.
3" Carpenter v. Bailey, 1873, 53 N. H. $9o; SARENT, C. J., p. 595.
"This case holds that a plea of defendant setting forth that lie had been informed
and believed that the facts published by him were true, was not sufficient allegation of
probable cause, for the information may have been from an unreliable source. But if
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A similar question, as to .what constitutes evidence of probable
cause for relief, has arisen in actions for malicious prosecution;
and has there been decided in accordance with the above view.
3
'
[To be continued.]
JFRtMIAH SMITH.
Cambridge, Mass.
probable cause had been properly pleaded, there is no doubt that information from a
credible source would have been received in evidence to support such plea." Prof. Chase.
23 Am. Law Rev., 365, note a.
31 Galloway v. Burr, 187S, 32 Michigan, 332, MAMarON, J. 332-334; Wilson v. Bowes,
1887, 64 Micb. 133, 137-8, 140; Bacon v. Towne, 1849, 4 Cushing, 217, SHAW, C. J., p.
240; Smith v. Munch, 1896, 65 Minnesota, 2s6, MITCHELL, J. 259-26o; Chatfield v. Comer-
ford, t866, 4 Foster & Finlason, zoo8; Lamb v. Galland, 1872, 44 Calif. 6o9; Lister v.
Perryman, 1870, L. R. 4 H. L. 521; Robbins v. David, 1879. S Viet. L. R. Cases at Law,
%63; Plasson v. Louisiana Lottery Co., z882, 34 La. Ann. 246; Day v. Cedar, zx7, x68
N. Y. Suppl. 334; Davenport v. N. Y. Central R. R., 1912, 149 N. Y. App. Div. 432, 43S-6;
Hicks v. Faulkner, 1878, L. R. Qu. B. Div. z67. HAwKINs, 3., p. 173; Clerk & Lindsel
on Torts, 2d Ed. 568.
